

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

13 April 1962

THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EST 12 Apr)

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Page 1 25X1

The USSR took further steps last week to promote a more conciliatory atmosphere for the next round of negotiations on Berlin. Moscow has agreed to resume normal operations of the US and Soviet Military Liaison Missions in Germany and made overtures to restore normal relations between the US and Soviet commandants in Berlin.

The Soviet press and radio promptly denounced the 10 April joint US-British statement on a nuclear test ban. The chief Soviet delegate at Geneva has pledged that the USSR would not stage tests during the conference if the West would make a similar pledge. There have been indications that the Soviets might follow this bid for a test moratorium with a proposal ostensibly designed to break the impasse over international controls to monitor a test ban.

FRANCE - ALGERIA Page 4 25X1

The overwhelming approval of De Gaulle's Algerian policy in the 8 April referendum in France further weakened the Secret Army Organization, already faced with signs of waning sympathy among Algeria's Europeans. De Gaulle, evidently realizing he cannot interpret the vote as a blank check for all his policies, has decided not to risk early elections and to replace unpopular Premier Michel Debré with Georges Pompidou. Pompidou, long one of De Gaulle's closest advisers, will push a program calculated to appeal to the left and center. In Algeria, difficulties have reportedly arisen in organizing the Local Force which the provisional executive, installed on 10 April, will use to keep order during the transitional period.

WEST NEW GUINEA Page 5 25X1

There is little prospect for early resumption of the secret Dutch-Indonesian talks. Sukarno has qualified his approval "in principle" of the most recent proposals for solving the dispute by stating that West New Guinea must still "return" to Indonesia in 1962. The Netherlands Government has deferred a decision on the proposals until later this week, probably to allow more time to formulate counterproposals. The Indonesian Government claims it has issued orders to stop military action and infiltrations in West New Guinea.

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SOUTH VIETNAM Page 6

Viet Cong activities reached their highest level in March. Increased rail sabotage, greater use of battalion-size forces, and augmented unit firepower were noted. The reported capture by government forces of Chinese-manufactured ammunition would, if confirmed, provide the first evidence of Viet Cong use of bloc military equipment. Hanoi has announced that the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam--the Viet Cong political arm--has held its first congress and elected a permanent organizational apparatus.

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BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA Page 9

The Sino-Soviet bloc is making considerably more than a token effort to ease Havana's most pressing economic problems, but probably will be unable to fulfill all of Cuba's requirements for foodstuffs and consumer goods. Deliveries of bloc foodstuffs, however, should be sufficient to maintain an adequate diet in Cuba. The bloc's agreements with Cuba already contain a number of innovations designed to foster the island's integration into bloc economic plans, and additional concessions may be made. Meanwhile, the slow process of implementing agreements for bloc aid in the construction of industrial projects is continuing.

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ARGENTINA Page 10

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President Guido has called a special session of Congress for 12-18 April and will ask it to amend the law on presidential succession to extend the list of those in line to hold the office temporarily and to postpone the date when elections for a new president become mandatory. He may also ask for special powers to remain in office until the scheduled end of Frondizi's term in 1964. Most of the political leaders recently consulted would like time to regroup for new elections. The problem of dealing with the victorious Peronista candidates in the recent elections is still unresolved; legally they are due to take office on 1 May. New austerity measures are adding to popular discontent and pressure on the government.

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
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Page 12^{25X1}
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There have been some indications recently that the Soviet and Chinese parties are attempting to reduce speculation that their relations are so strained that a break between them is imminent. Their show of "unity" may be intended to discourage the West from attempting to exploit any division between the two countries and to quiet fears among rank-and-file Communists, many of whom have only recently learned of the depth of the crisis. On the basic issues, however, Moscow and Peiping remain as far apart as ever.

NORTH KOREA AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE Page 15

North Korea, which signed military pacts with both the USSR and Communist China last July, has been making its sympathy for Peiping and Tirana increasingly clear. The North Koreans have profited from Sino-Soviet competition in the past, however, and they are unlikely to express their sympathies to the point of impairing their relations with the USSR.

ALBANIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS Page 16^{25X1}
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The USSR and its European satellites have severed almost all ties with Albania. Government contacts are kept at a minimum, party dealings have ceased, and long-term credits and economic aid have been canceled. Disruption of the Albanian economy has been prevented by large-scale Chinese Communist assistance and by the continuation of trade with the European satellites. The Albanian regime is seeking to enhance its stability by developing economic and political contacts with the West and among the non-committed states, but it depends basically on its efficient security organs. Moscow remains committed to the overthrow of the Albanian leadership, and Albania's neighbors probably are making preparations to preserve their interests in Albania should the present regime weaken.

SYRIA Page 17

Syrian military leaders have run into difficulties in reconstituting a civilian government. Political leaders, including imprisoned President Qudsi, are refusing to participate in a regime dominated by the army and are demanding restoration of constitutional government. The military command appears to be reneging on its promise to hold a plebiscite on the question of union with Egypt, but pro-Nasir sentiment remains strong. Since the junta lacks

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support from both the conservative business and property-owning elements and the leftist-socialist pan-Arabists, its life is likely to be short. [redacted]

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FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES Page 1'25X1
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One consequence of the emerging settlement in Algeria is likely to be early resumption of French diplomatic relations with the six Middle Eastern Arab states which broke with France at the time of the Suez affair in 1956. Paris has already held preliminary talks with Syria; Saudi Arabia and Jordan are probably next on the list. Points of friction remain, particularly with Egypt, but all the Arab states see immediate benefits in closer ties with Paris and are unlikely to be deterred by France's continuing cooperation with Israel. [redacted]

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Page 19

Popular support for the governing Council of State has been on the decline for several weeks, partly as a result of continuing economic difficulties and partly because of political attacks by the generally moderate National Civic Union (UCN), the country's largest party. The UCN leaders, identified in the public mind with the government but in fact unable to control its policy, apparently feel it necessary to assail the council's record for campaigning purposes in the December elections. The council is also troubled by some internal dissension but retains, at least for the present, the loyalty of the military. [redacted]

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DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AMONG SOVIET WRITERS Page 20

The Soviet regime has recently moved with new vigor to contain the ferment among Soviet writers. The extremists have been rebuked, in relatively mild terms, and one chief editor has been removed as too liberal. These actions have been accompanied, however, by limited praise for the more moderate liberal writers. The disciplinary measures are unlikely to provide more than a temporary check to efforts by the nonconformists to expand their area of creative freedom. [redacted]

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

KHRUSHCHEV'S PROPAGANDA CHIEF Page 1

Leonid Fedorovich Ilichev, since 1958 chief of the Soviet party propaganda machine, is typical of the energetic new men Khrushchev is bringing to the fore to help run the regime. At the 22nd party congress last October, Ilichev was elevated to the secretariat--the party's powerful administrative arm--apparently to understudy the top ideological arbiters, M. A. Suslov and the elderly O. V. Kuusinen. Formerly editor of Pravda, Ilichev has also had wide experience in ideological work and foreign affairs, and now has a major role in publicizing the party line on Stalinism. OK

EVOLUTION OF THE FRENCH COMMUNITY OF STATES Page 4 25X1

De Gaulle sees a Paris-oriented Eurafrikan community as a means of bolstering France's claim to be a world power, and has recently referred to France's present relations with its former colonial territories in Black Africa as a model of what may be achieved in French-Algeria and cooperation. Although the constitutional structure devised for the French Community in 1958 is now a dead letter, Paris retains a high degree of influence in most of these sub-Saharan states, largely by virtue of its extensive aid program. Besides substantial indirect aid such as tariff preferences, direct French economic and defense support will approximate \$600,000,000 in 1962. Several of the republics depend on French subsidies for about half their budgets. OK

PRESIDENT AYUB AND PAKISTAN Page 8

During his three and a half years of rule, President Ayub has attempted to establish political and economic stability and to prepare for a return to responsible civilian self-government. Despite considerable success in industrial and business development, he has been unable to make significant advances in fields affecting the large majority of the rural population. Discontent has become more obvious, especially in East Pakistan, and Ayub has taken security and political measures to protect his own position. Continued tension will not deter him from efforts to achieve his goals, but it will almost certainly lead him to seek additional support from Western nations and to criticize any failure to provide as much support as he feels he needs. OK

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